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Abstract	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
method	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulations.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
understandable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
requiring	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠIdeas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠhave	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcases	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurities	 ﾠand	 ﾠExchange	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalyses,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠreview	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠarbitrariness,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalyses.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠserious	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠlack	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
project	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcosts),	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscipline	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠproceed.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠa	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠrare	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠso	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠuse	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecautionary	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“expert	 ﾠ
judgment.”	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrare	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠsome	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaximin,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠinformational	 ﾠgaps	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
time.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
I.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSeparating	 ﾠQuestions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠShould	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠ
judiciary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident,	 ﾠor	 ﾠCongress?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐
benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
regulation.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐
benefit	 ﾠanalyses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠshould	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
decisions.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalyses,	 ﾠor	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠuse.2	 ﾠTo	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsteps,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
investigate	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠerrors.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
judicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠwould	 ﾠitself	 ﾠfail	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠreview	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
undoubtedly	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
spent	 ﾠon	 ﾠlitigation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠerrors,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠor	 ﾠharmful.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreview	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠmistakes	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠan	 ﾠex	 ﾠpost	 ﾠcorrective	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ex	 ﾠante	 ﾠdeterrent.3	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠstrengthens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
analysts,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdiminishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
gain.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠerr.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠgeneralists,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
specialists,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlimited.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠideological	 ﾠtilt,	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠunpredictability	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmistakes.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠevery	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠthree-ﾭ‐
judge	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠthree	 ﾠRepublican	 ﾠappointees,	 ﾠan	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠhearing,	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠso	 ﾠthan	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠa	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠof	 ﾠDemocratic	 ﾠappointees.4	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠ
challengers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠwin	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠlose,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠholds.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠare	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
introduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠcautionary	 ﾠnote.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠreview	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠpoliticized,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
unpredictability	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinevitable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠinaccurate.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠOrders,	 ﾠ
executive	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnoteworthy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠauthorized	 ﾠto	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠanalysis.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠreview	 ﾠis	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunavailable.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠoverseen	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ(OIRA)?	 ﾠ
Insofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠits	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠrole,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Department	 ﾠof	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠagency.6	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2 For an example of judicial review, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991). 
3 A relevant decision is Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (2011). 
4 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 University of 
Chicago Law Review 761 (2008). 
5 Executive Order 13563; Executive Order 12866. 
6 There is an exemption for rules from the Internal Revenue Service.	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 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrulemakers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvolved,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
apply.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprocess.7	 ﾠIf	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠmight	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
convincing.8	 ﾠBut	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠerrors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseems	 ﾠpersuasive	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠso	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠreview	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠis	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐consuming	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdelays.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity:	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpertise	 ﾠon	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulation	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠfor	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠto	 ﾠreview	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulations	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠadding	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpersonnel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠerrors,	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠ(along	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠcollaborators	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch)	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠspecialize	 ﾠin	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠfamiliarity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠtools,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
improvements.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠworked	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators,	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠanalyses.9	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthose	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠreform.	 ﾠA	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠargument	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustifies	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠrestraint.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubtly,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpresidents	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcautious	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsubjecting	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Executive	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠpersonally,	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ
“own”	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠ
himself,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠ
distance	 ﾠcould	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“enabling	 ﾠconstraint,”	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident’s	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
is,	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠif	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠattributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountervailing	 ﾠ
point,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmisdirected	 ﾠor	 ﾠwrong.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation 
- Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489 (2002).  
8 Executive Order 13579 does not subject independent agencies to OIRA review, but it does say that they 
“should” follow the requirements of Executive Order 13563: “Executive Order 13563 set out general 
requirements directed to executive agencies concerning public participation, integration and innovation, 
flexible approaches, and science.  To the extent permitted by law, independent regulatory agencies should 
comply with these provisions as well.” 
9 See Memorandum of Understanding, OIRA and US Commodities Futures Trading Commission, available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/oira_cftc_mou_2012.pdf	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If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
OIRA	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠCongress	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠto	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
form,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident:	 ﾠShould	 ﾠ
Congress	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠOIRA?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠshould	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠjust	 ﾠoutlined.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠanother	 ﾠform,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠreview	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmandated,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠCongress	 ﾠ
nonetheless	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠregulate?	 ﾠThat	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown,10	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmy	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠ
here.11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCost-ﾭ‐Benefit	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKnowledge	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A.	 ﾠA	 ﾠDefinition	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠentail?	 ﾠA	 ﾠfull	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
elaborate	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠits	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
costs).12	 ﾠVery	 ﾠbriefly,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
quantify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonetize	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠand	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeasibility	 ﾠ
constraint,	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhard	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
impossible	 ﾠeither	 ﾠto	 ﾠquantify	 ﾠor	 ﾠmonetize.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠ13653,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdirects	 ﾠ
executive	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠto	 ﾠquantify	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠand	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠas	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠ“may	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠqualitatively)	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
impossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠquantify,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠequity,	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠdignity,	 ﾠfairness,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistributive	 ﾠ
impacts.”13	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunder	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠOrders,	 ﾠ
cost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠrequirement.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
permitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmust	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaximizes	 ﾠnet	 ﾠbenefits.14	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmet,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠforward	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10 A valuable discussion is Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis And Financial 
Regulations, 103 Am Econ Rev (Papers and Proceedings) 393 (2013).  
11 See Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346466: “Indeed, BCA would seem more appropriate 
for financial regulation where data are better and more reliable, and where regulators do not confront 
ideologically charged valuation problems like those concerning mortality risk and environmental harm. The 
benefits and costs of financial regulation are commensurable monetary gains and losses, and so can be 
easily compared.” 
12 OMB Circular A-4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4,  offers many 
details. 
13 See Executive Order 13563, 76 Fed Reg 3821 (2011) 
14 Id. 	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B.	 ﾠWho	 ﾠKnows?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
followers	 ﾠof	 ﾠFriedrich	 ﾠHayek	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“knowledge	 ﾠproblem”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠface	 ﾠin	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠdispersed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsociety.15	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
undertaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠdaunting	 ﾠchallenges,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠknow.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
estimates.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠonly	 ﾠranges,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠranges	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠwide.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmight	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠoutcomes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠassign	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠ
“Knightian	 ﾠuncertainty,”	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdaunting	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐
benefit	 ﾠanalysis.16	 ﾠAgency	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠ(who	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠparochial	 ﾠinterests),	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠmistakes.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuniquely	 ﾠ
daunting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠcast	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠstandards,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
great	 ﾠdeal.17	 ﾠProjections	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeculation.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime;	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreally	 ﾠknow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠfleet-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(say)	 ﾠ40	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnow?	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠautomobiles	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpredictable,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠ
impose.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠcars	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfuel-ﾭ‐efficient,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠ
purchase	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠcars,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠor	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠnumber?	 ﾠWill	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠherd	 ﾠ
toward	 ﾠfuel-ﾭ‐efficiency,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmove	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠdirection?	 ﾠHerding	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
introduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠunpredictability.18	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“rebound	 ﾠeffect”:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠcars	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠto	 ﾠdrive,	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠmore.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore?	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfuel-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠfleet?	 ﾠ
Estimates	 ﾠmay	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreliable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspeculation	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Projections	 ﾠof	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeculation.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonetize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“energy	 ﾠsecurity”	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
decreased	 ﾠreliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠoil.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreliance,	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠ
exactly,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠturn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠequivalence?19	 ﾠNor	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
15 A good discussion is Daniel Klein, Knowledge and Coordination: A Liberal Interpretation (2012). 
16 See Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921). 
17 NAT’L HIGH. TRAF. SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: 
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2017–MY 2025 PASSENGER CARS AND 
LIGHT TRUCKS 49 tbl. 13 (2012).	 ﾠ
18 On this point, and the limits of prediction, see Duncan Watts, Everything Is Obvious (2011). 
19 NAT’L HIGH. TRAF. SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: 
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2017–MY 2025 PASSENGER CARS AND 
LIGHT TRUCKS (2012). 	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it	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠquantify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠair	 ﾠpollution.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mortality	 ﾠand	 ﾠmorbidity	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticulate	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠprojections	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠobservational	 ﾠstudies,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreliable,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase	 ﾠshow	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠbenefits.20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
reductions	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonetize	 ﾠthose	 ﾠreductions,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“social	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon,”	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠintense	 ﾠdisagreements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠdiffer.21	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠbulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠsavings,22	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial,23	 ﾠand	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprojection	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠcars	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbought.	 ﾠAgencies	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠask	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠloss	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfuel-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠ
fleet.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ(somewhat	 ﾠ
speculative)	 ﾠranges	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ(somewhat	 ﾠspeculative)	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠestimates.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠtempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠwonder,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
cost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠworthwhile.	 ﾠNumerous	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠanalysts	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠdisagree.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠchild’s	 ﾠplay	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠexceptionally	 ﾠwide	 ﾠranges,	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠchild’s	 ﾠplay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠlawyer	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠ
credibly,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency’s	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠare	 ﾠeither	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠor	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠpessimistic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
hence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠeither	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠstringent	 ﾠor	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠlenient.24	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠmistake	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠwide	 ﾠ
ranges,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.25	 ﾠSome	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ
along	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplausible;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdebater’s	 ﾠpoints,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐serving	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠof	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐organized	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
technical	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠdisagree,	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother	 ﾠview	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplausible	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠconvincing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠare	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠview	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
category.	 ﾠDisagreements	 ﾠamong	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠat	 ﾠsea.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠno	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
disagreeing	 ﾠabout,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠisolate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠwould	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20 See Francesca Dominici et al., Particulate Matter Matters, 344 Science 257 (2014). 
21 See Michael Greenstone et al., Developing a Social Cost of Carbon for US Regulatory Analysis: A 
Methodology and Interpretation, 7 Environmental Economics and Policy 23 (2013); Robert S. Pindyck, 
Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us? (2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19244 
22 See note supra. 
23 See Ted Gayer and W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences With Energy Regulations (2012), 
available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Overriding-Consumer-Preferences-with-Energy-
Regulations-Final.pdf	 ﾠ
24 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L. J. 2255 (2002). 
25 See John Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 
(2008).	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would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscipline	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠconclusions,	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
conclusions	 ﾠare	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠothers	 ﾠare	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠBreakeven	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠPort	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠStorm	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
challenging	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
underlying	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexceptionally	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠface	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠdomains.	 ﾠAre	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠ
exceptionally	 ﾠor	 ﾠuniquely	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrespect?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthink	 ﾠso.26	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
regulations	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠunusually	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠchallenges.27	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠuniverse	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠcategory.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠunreliable	 ﾠpredictions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠanticipating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Treasury	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠOIRA	 ﾠreview,	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
long	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠby	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbest	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠis	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠdifficult,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠis	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
evaluate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠview,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠinspection	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠregulations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠstipulate,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbelieve,28	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠare	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠamidst	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty.	 ﾠSuppose,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠoccur,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(according	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠ
analyses)	 ﾠsomewhere	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$500	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$10	 ﾠtrillion.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
agency	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠits	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠin	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠHow,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠproceed?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠignorance,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐honored	 ﾠ
tool	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠport	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstorm:	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
26 See John Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, Yale LJ (forthcoming 2015); Jeffrey 
Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit Analysis for Financial Regulators (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378562 
27 See Coates, supra note.
 
28 See John Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, Yale LJ (forthcoming 2015); Jeffrey 
Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit Analysis for Financial Regulators (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378562	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analysis.29	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimple.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ$500	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠare.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠhypothesis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ$500	 ﾠmillion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠsee	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠor	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
estimates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsave	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ60	 ﾠand	 ﾠ250	 ﾠlives	 ﾠper	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ60	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠlower	 ﾠbound.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ$9	 ﾠ
million,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠsurvives	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhypothetical.	 ﾠA	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice,	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrape,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcost	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
$500	 ﾠmillion.30	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrape.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsimplest	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ$500	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
expenditure.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠget	 ﾠtraction	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
specify	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠbound	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrapes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠbound	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠrape.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠit	 ﾠexpects	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrapes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠrape	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ$500,000,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
regulation.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
projections.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdid.31	 ﾠIt	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠby	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠrape.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠused	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠit	 ﾠrelied	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠvaluation	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠasked	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠregion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠrape.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ
elicited	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ$310,000	 ﾠper	 ﾠvictim,	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“society.”	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠit	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ$480,000,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$670,000	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjuveniles.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
numbers,	 ﾠit	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrape.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠrapes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
prevent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠmonetizable	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrape	 ﾠand	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠ
abuse	 ﾠis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ$46.6	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠannually	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprisons	 ﾠand	 ﾠjails,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ$5.2	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠannually	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠfacilities.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠits	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
prevented	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ1,671	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ260,000	 ﾠannual	 ﾠprison	 ﾠrapes,	 ﾠits	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠits	 ﾠcosts.32	 ﾠMany	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ
here,33	 ﾠbut	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠsound.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsome	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠare	 ﾠmissing,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠwide	 ﾠranges	 ﾠare	 ﾠinevitable,	 ﾠan	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29 Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, California L Rev (forthcoming 2014). 
30 http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 For some notes, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, California L Rev (forthcoming 
2015).	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be	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠintractable	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
tractable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
B.	 ﾠBreakeven	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulators	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulation.34	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmeltdown,	 ﾠranges	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
$700	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$2	 ﾠbillion.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠdisagree	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠfall	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrange,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsure	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
resolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisagreement.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
meltdown,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠit	 ﾠoccur,35	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠrange	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$150	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠend	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠsome	 ﾠanalysts)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$3	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠother	 ﾠanalysts)	 ﾠ$51	 ﾠ
trillion.36	 ﾠRemarkably,	 ﾠprojections	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠ
unrealistic.37	 ﾠHow	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠproceed?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatute	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacting,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠeasy.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠis	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠirrelevant,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠsome	 ﾠstatutes.38	 ﾠBut	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwill	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠits	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
unaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠit.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠlook	 ﾠlike?	 ﾠIs	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠfeasible?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠpossibility.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐end	 ﾠcost	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠis	 ﾠ$2	 ﾠbillion.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
reduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeltdown	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠpercent,	 ﾠit	 ﾠsurvives	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐end	 ﾠcost	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeltdown	 ﾠ($150	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
reduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeltdown	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ(one	 ﾠin	 ﾠseventy-ﾭ‐
five).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠplausibly,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
requisite	 ﾠvicinity,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠbound	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvicinity,	 ﾠits	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurvive	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠnotices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeltdown	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrillions,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠ
reasonable.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworthwhile.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠ$2	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
event	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$20	 ﾠ
billion.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupper	 ﾠbound	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$20	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe:	 ﾠIs	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
34 For valuable discussion, see Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial 
Regulation, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188990 
35 See id.: “Agreement on a figure in the range $150 billion to $3 trillion (viz. a crisis cost between 1% and 
20% of US GDP of approximately $15 trillion) would seem relatively easy to reach given the widely 
respected estimates of Reinhart and Rogoff. We would advocate a figure in the $1-2 trillion range.” 
36 See Coates, supra note. 
37 Id. 
38 See Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013), and in particular this suggestion: “The law 
does not require agencies to measure the immeasurable. CFTC’s discussion of unquantifiable benefits 
fulfills its statutory obligation to consider and evaluate potential costs and benefits. .... Where Congress has 
required a ‘rigorous, quantitative economic analysis,’ it has made that requirement clear in the agency’s 
statute, but it has imposed no such requirement here.” Id. at 378.	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that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ1	 ﾠin	 ﾠ10	 ﾠchance	 ﾠof	 ﾠaverting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevent?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠno,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠfails	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠare,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠstylized	 ﾠexamples.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐
benefit	 ﾠanalysis39	 ﾠor	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠeasier,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators.40	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠconclusion:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfeasible,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠuse	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprove	 ﾠhelpful,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations.41	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠview,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠintractable	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠchallenges.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠseventy-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
chance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmeltdown,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠboth	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
speculative	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠother	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠat	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠcomplicating	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwide,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
wider,	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠ
analysis,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠpretense	 ﾠto	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
lack.42	 ﾠPrivate	 ﾠadaptations,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠanticipated,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators.43	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠview	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend,	 ﾠa	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠevaluated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract.	 ﾠEverything	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulators,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠseemed,	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠobservers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
participants,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimpossibly	 ﾠdaunting.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠnow	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfuture.44	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠno	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
39 See Posner and Weyl, supra note. 
40 Gordon, supra note, argues that because financial regulation is a constructed system, and does not involve 
a range of natural facts (such as the carcinogenic properties of a chemical), financial regulators cannot 
engage in cost-benefit analysis. It is true that the behavior of regulated entities may be difficult to anticipate 
and that the systemic effects of interventions may not be easily calculated. But it is not clear that the 
“constructed” nature of the financial system means, in principle, that changes in that system cannot be 
assessed in quantitative terms, at least if agencies have appropriate tools.  To be sure, agencies may lack 
those tools. Note in this regard that in Business Roundable, supra note, the agency did quantify a number of 
relevant costs and benefits, though not enough to satisfy the reviewing court. 
41 Posner and Weyl, supra note. 
42 Coates, supra note. 
43 See Jeffrey Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit Analysis for Financial Regulators (2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378562 
44 A possible counterargument might come from Watts, supra note, who emphasizes the impossibility of 
prediction in cases in which social influences are at work. When such influences move markets – for 
example, cultural markets – it may be difficult or impossible to make predictions in advance, because the 
influences, and their effects, cannot be anticipated. Even if the counterargument is convincing, I do not 
believe that it applies to many regulations. A different counterargument can be found in Gordon, supra. I 	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 ﾠ
breakeven	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠrealistically	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
candid	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified.45	 ﾠThat	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠpromotes	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
accountability,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ
information.46	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFive	 ﾠStrategies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFace	 ﾠof	 ﾠIgnorance	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
sea.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacting),	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
requiring	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsimple.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ
Lacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequisite	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
proceed?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠliberty,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠannounce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproceed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproceed,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠproof,	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠprojection	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnet	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠprecept:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reliable	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnet	 ﾠ
benefits,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproceed.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠappeal.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠarises	 ﾠif	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlack	 ﾠ
sufficient	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠas	 ﾠelsewhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
absence.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠcould	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecept	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
arbitrary	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐defeating.	 ﾠ(In	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
purchase	 ﾠinsurance.)	 ﾠIn	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠ
giving	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠconsider,	 ﾠas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠone	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠdeposit	 ﾠ
insurance	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠpuzzling.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasked	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠjudgment.47	 ﾠ
Reasonable	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠidea,48	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
cannot give a full discussion of that counterargument here, but see note supra and note infra for relevant 
notations. 
45 See Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, supra note. 
46 Gordon, supra note, emphasizes that in this domain, “rules will create a new financial system and thus 
change the assumptions on the basis of which the purported cost and benefits were calculated.” It is true 
that rules change old assumptions, in part because of private adaptation; the question is whether the 
calculation can be based on new assumptions. That task might well be daunting, for the reasons that 
Gordon outlines (see also Watts, supra note), but at least broadly similar challenges are raised by other 
kinds of rules, including fuel economy rules, for which cost-benefit analyses  are produced as a matter of 
course. 
47 Coates, supra note; OMB Circular A-4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 
48 See Coates, supra note. The argument for “the pragmatics of regulatory judgment,” in Gordon, supra 
note, seems to belong in the same general category. Gordon notes that his  rejection of cost-benefit analysis 
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 ﾠ
“professional	 ﾠjudgment”	 ﾠthreatens	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠblack	 ﾠbox,	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
ideological	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
easier	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoutsiders	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠballot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfights.	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠto	 ﾠshareholders	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
destructive	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠallow	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
projection	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsequences,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal.	 ﾠNote	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠ“professional	 ﾠjudgment,”	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
unaccompanied	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisciplined	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“professional	 ﾠjudgment”	 ﾠis	 ﾠregrettably	 ﾠreminiscent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠbaseball	 ﾠscouts	 ﾠin	 ﾠMichael	 ﾠLewis’	 ﾠbestseller	 ﾠMoneyball,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
judgment.49	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠdenies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise,	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty.50	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“professional	 ﾠ
judgment,”	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠin	 ﾠOMB	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimpressive	 ﾠor	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠ
aspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠdocument.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠmight	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠprecautionary	 ﾠ
principle,51	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
demonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠfruition.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgo	 ﾠforward	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠsense	 ﾠquantified.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠforms,	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐defeating.52	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠrisks.	 ﾠCertainly	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
true	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠnontrivial	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
impose	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠprecautions	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
risks,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuniversally	 ﾠprecautionary,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠrisk-ﾭ‐
reduction	 ﾠcan	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrisky.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠprecautionary	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrefined.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwould	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠscenario.53	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
identify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠresult	 ﾠeither	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠregulating	 ﾠor	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrefusing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
regulate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
meltdown,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfall	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠalong	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
wide	 ﾠrange.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpoints,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
to project the new regime and its consequences.” Id. The question is whether that projection is possible 
without an effort to engage in at least some form of cost-benefit balancing, perhaps with the aid of	 ﾠ
breakeven analysis, and certainly with continuing monitoring of the effects of regulatory interventions. 
Gordon rightly emphasizes the need for such monitoring and for continuing learning on the part of 
regulators. Id. 
49 See Michael Lewis, Moneyball. 
50 See the complex verdict is Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise (2013). 
51 See Daniel Steel, Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle (2014). 
52 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U Pa L Rev 1003 (2003).
 
53 For detailed discussion and citations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (2007).	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that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠscenario,	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
disastrous	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmeltdown	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠargument	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
favor	 ﾠof	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠscenarios,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠassign	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠargument	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
ultimately	 ﾠprove	 ﾠconvincing.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountless	 ﾠimaginable	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠcatastrophe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠare	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
expensive.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠwell	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠdislocations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty,	 ﾠmaximin	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠits	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
creates	 ﾠserious	 ﾠdangers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
steps	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠits	 ﾠuse	 ﾠunnecessary.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠAgencies	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpick,	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠof	 ﾠflipping	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoin.54	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠunlawful,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠignorance,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.55	 ﾠIn	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠscenario.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠwill	 ﾠface	 ﾠit.56	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠpick,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfully	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠknow	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoin	 ﾠflip.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhoped	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠare	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠrare.57	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠsense	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcatalogue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠcourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
proceed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts.58	 ﾠOne	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
catalogue,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠexceptionally	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠproceed,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare;	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠabsence,	 ﾠ
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54 Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 Social Research 757 
(1977). 
55 See Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239155 (2013), and particularly this striking claim: 
“There is a category of agency decisions is which it is rational to be arbitrary, in the sense that no first-
order reason can be given for agency choice within a certain domain, yet some choice or other is 
inescapable, legally mandatory, or both. In some cases, even coin-flipping may be a perfectly rational 
strategy of decisionmaking for agencies.” 
56 Relevant discussion can also be found in Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, 
Drifting, 58 Royal Institute of Philosophy 157 (2006). 
57 For valuable observations, see id., which emphasizes the case of individuals, but which also has 
implications for regulatory judgments. 
58 See Posner and Weyl, supra note.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
regulations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠ(depending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠstatute).59	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠface	 ﾠserious	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠsevere,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠspeculative.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠleast	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠfeasible,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregulators,	 ﾠno	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠkinds,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠassess	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠunavailable,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠbreakeven	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠknow	 ﾠso	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠmight	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
useful	 ﾠguidance.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠcatastrophe	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠlead	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠto	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmense	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠIgnorance	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaspiration	 ﾠto	 ﾠfull	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
aspiration	 ﾠcan	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinformation-ﾭ‐forcing.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
59 See id: “The importance of developing methods for benefit-cost analysis for financial regulation can 
scarcely be overstated. In recent years, courts have woken up to the fact that many such regulations lack a 
sound economic basis and have started blocking them.” 